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Chill: African-American Electorate

DID THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN ELECTORATE
UNINTENTIONALLY HELP ELECT DONALD TRUMP
PRESIDENT?
C. Daniel Chill*

INTRODUCTION
Political scholars generally posit that income inequality is the
primary cause for considering America to be electorally flawed.1 But,
in fact, it is race, not wealth, that fundamentally impacts the electoral
dynamic in the United States, at least during this past decade and more.
Examples of racially driven electoral influences abound.
Statistical analysis proves beyond peradventure that Barack
Obama could not have been twice elected President if not for the
massive vote he received from the African-American electorate, an
electorate that clearly is not associated with wealth and can be counted
among the poorest of American citizenry. In 2000, Republican dirty
tricksters used push polling to spread a false rumor that Senator John
McCain had fathered an illegitimate African-American child.2 That
same year, Mr. McCain called the Confederate flag a “symbol of
heritage,” saying it should be up to South Carolinians whether to
display it on their statehouse grounds.3 He later apologized, admitting
that he had compromised his principles in an effort to win the state’s
primary.4 In 2008, after Barack Obama defeated Hillary Clinton in
* Professor of Touro College & University System. The author would like to thank Elaine M.
Reich, Esq. for her invaluable editorial assistance.
1 Ross Zucker, What Type of Political System is the US?, 9 J. OF POL. POWER 5, 8 (2016).
2 Ann Banks, Dirty Tricks, South Carolina and John McCain, THE NATION (Jan. 14, 2008),
https://www.thenation.com/article/dirty-tricks-south-carolina-and-john-mccain/.
3 Steven A. Holmes, After Campaigning on Candor, McCain Admits He Lacked it on
Confederate Flag Issue, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/20/us/
after-campaigning-on-candor-mccain-admits-he-lacked-it-on-confederate-flag-issue.html.
4 Id.
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South Carolina, Bill Clinton intimated that Obama only won because
of race: “Jesse Jackson won South Carolina in ‘84 and ‘88.”5 Several
weeks later, Geraldine Ferraro, who backed Mrs. Clinton’s candidacy,
alluded to the same effect: “[i]f Obama was a white man, he would not
be in this position[,]” she told a reporter.6 “He happens to be very
lucky to be who he is. And the country is caught up in the concept.”7
In 2016, without a massive African-American vote in her favor, Hillary
Clinton likely would have lost the Democratic primary to Bernie
Sanders. Mrs. Clinton won large majorities over Sanders in every state
with a large population of African-Americans. For example, on
June 14, 2016, Mrs. Clinton won 79% of the vote in Washington, D.C.,
which has the largest African-American voter concentration in the
United States.8 In the recent Alabama U.S. Senate contest, a 95%
African-American vote for the Democratic candidate propelled him to
a narrow victory.
From the founding of our republic to the present, race has been
at the center of our body politic, and what to do about it has been an
American political and legal conundrum. Examples of the centrality
of race in American politics can be found in many areas such as slave
owner founding fathers (Washington, Jefferson, etc.), the Three-Fifths
Compromise, the Civil War, Reconstruction, segregation, Jim Crow,
Plessy v. Ferguson, and The Dred Scott decision, all of which played
a central and dismal role in the drama of racial representation in the
United States. Recent events in Charlottesville and Virginia, and
President Trump’s remarks with respect to same, have set off a racial
firestorm throughout the country. Sports (“Taking the Knee”),
patriotism and the President have become a national race issue.

5

Melissa Clyne, Hillary Asks South Carolina Blacks for a Second Chance, NEWSMAX (May
28, 2015, 12:21 PM), www.newsmax.com/politics/hillary-clinton-south-carolina-blacksvote/2015/05/28/id/647247/.
6 Katharine Q. Seelye & Julie Bosman, Ferraro’s Obama Remarks Become Talk of
Campaign, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/12/us/politics/
12campaign.html.
7 Id.
8 Yamiche Alcindor & Patrick Healy, Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders Meet as Their
Battle Ends, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/15/us/politics/
bernie-sanders-campaign.html. The New York Times article on July 13, 2016 reported that
polls indicate that whites feel aggrieved by African-Americans and that race relations in the
United States are bleak. See Giovanni Russonello, Race Relations Are at Lowest Point in
Obama Presidency, Poll Finds, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/14/us/most-americanshold-grim-view-of-race-relations-poll-finds.html.
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The empowerment of African-Americans and other minorities
in the American electoral arena traces directly to the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 (hereinafter “VRA”).9 With the passage in 1965 of the VRA,
race entered election fora with gladiatorial force. This article explores
how starting in 1965, the VRA produced an apex of electoral success
for African-Americans (and ultimately language minorities) only to
recede a half century later with the unintended consequences of
possibly helping to elect as President of the United States, Donald
Trump, a man very much not a candidate of choice of the minority
community.
Part I reviews the various statutes making up the VRA, as well
as the legislative history that informed its mission. Part II probes the
negative political consequences of majority-minority VRA districts,
namely lower voter turnout, how the VRA helped the Republican Party
to take control of the House of Representatives, and specifically, its
influence on the election of Donald Trump as President. Part III
analyzes the various Supreme Court decisions involving the VRA and
demonstrates the Supreme Court’s steady erosion of the
constitutionality and/or the validity of the VRA. Part IV suggests
remedies designed to correct collateral and undesired political fallout
resulting from an overconcentration of minorities in majority-minority
congressional districts. The conclusion will summarize the points
articulated in this article and suggest future redistricting steps to be
taken.
I.

THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

The original VRA was designed to address existing barriers to
fulfillment of African-American participation in the electoral process.
It contained two primary sections, § 2 and § 5.
Section 2 of the Act10 follows the language of the Fifteenth
Amendment11 forbidding discrimination in the voting franchise on
9 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965) (originally enacted as Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-110, 79 Stat. 437) (current version, as amended, at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2016)).
10 Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2 (stating “[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting,
or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political
subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account
of race or color.”).
11 Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment states: “The right of citizens of the United States
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color or previous condition or servitude.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
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account of race or color. In City of Mobile v. Bolden,12 the Supreme
Court held that to prevail in a § 2 action, the plaintiff must prove that
the discrimination was purposeful and that the state authorities
intended such discrimination.13 In response to the Mobile case,
Congress in 1982 amended § 2 to explicitly proscribe any voting
practice that had a discriminatory effect irrespective of whether the
voting discrimination was purposefully intended.14
However, during congressional debates on the 1982
Amendments, a racial concern immediately manifested itself on
account of the proposed results test.15 Many legislators, particularly
those from the South, were deeply concerned that the effects test would
result in a standard of proportional representation by race.16 In other
words, they were worried that minorities would be entitled to be
elected to the legislative body in proportion to their share of the
relevant population, irrespective of whether the actual votes for
minority candidates warranted such an outcome.17 In the view of these
Southern legislators, under the results test, any voting law or procedure
in the country that failed to result in mirroring minority population
makeup in a particular community would be vulnerable to legal
challenge under § 2.18
On April 24, 1982, Senator Robert Dole of Kansas proposed a
compromise on both § 2 and § 5 that was designed to allay the concern
of those troubled by the proportional representation issue.19 The new
12

446 U.S. 55 (1980).
Id. at 66.
14 The relevant portion of Section (a) of § 2 relating to Mobile, as amended in 1982, reads
as follows:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice,
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982) (current version as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2016)) (emphasis
added), amended by Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96
Stat. 131, 134 (1982).
15 See generally Voting Rights Act: Hearings before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the Comm. on the Judiciary United States S., 97th Cong. 342-66 (1982) [hereinafter “Senate
Hearings”].
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 As discussed later in this article, this concern of unconstitutionally broad affirmative
electoral action for minorities proved to be prescient.
19 See Senate Hearings, supra note 15.
13
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language of § 2 proposed to retain the results language but to append a
new subsection (b) as follows which became part of the final bill:
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based
on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the
political processes leading to nomination or election in
the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of a class of citizens
protected by subsection (a) in that its members have
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to
participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which
members of a protected class have been elected to
office in the State or political subdivision is one
circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That
nothing in this section establishes a right to have
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal
to their proportion in the population.20
This compromise, however, contains within itself an inherent tension
because § 2 has a built-in preference and is remedial while lack of
proportionality speaks a different and opposing theme.
Section 2 claims are vote dilution claims that focus on voting
systems, practices and procedures that dilute the ability of minorities
to elect candidates of their choice. They usually arise when whites and
minorities “consistently prefer different candidates . . . when voting is
‘racially polarized.’”21 Minority votes can be diluted in two ways:
spreading the minority group among many districts so they are never a
majority in any one district (fracturing, which is also known as
cracking) or over-concentrating minority voters into one or two
districts thereby reducing minority electoral power in other districts
(packing).22 Accordingly, obstacles that interfere with the ability of
members of minority racial and language groups to have a fair
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice lie at the heart of the § 2
20 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1982) (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2016)) (emphasis
added), amended by Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 § 3. See Senate Hearings, supra
note 15. For an extensive review of the legislative history of the § 2 Amendments to the
Voting Rights Act, refer to Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments
to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (1983).
21 Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1663, 1671-72 (2001).
22 Id. at 1672.
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vote dilution claim. The most blatant example of vote dilution occurs
as a result of white polarized voting that usually results in deflating
efforts of minorities to elect candidates of their choice (assumed to be
fellow minorities) and would “dilute” the minority vote and thus effect
minority vote dilution.23
Section 5 of the VRA prohibits certain defined jurisdictions
called “covered counties” (mostly in the South), subject to its
provisions (the “Coverage Formula”), from implementing changes in
a “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” without
federal authorization (“Preclearance”).24 The jurisdiction must either
(1) obtain a judgment from the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia declaring that the proposed change “does not
have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging
the right to vote on account of race or color,” or (2) secure prior
approval from the U.S. Attorney General.25 Under a 2006 amendment
to § 5 of the VRA, all covered jurisdictions were compelled to avoid
drawing new districts that would “diminish[] the number of districts in
which minority groups [could] ‘elect their preferred candidates of
choice.’”26 In other words, there could be no retrogression in the
abilities of minority voters to elect candidates of their choice (called
“ability to elect districts”).27
In light of the need to comply with the VRA—which requires
states to give all of their citizens an equal opportunity to participate in
the process and to elect representatives of their choice—legislators, the
Justice Department and the courts compelled legislatures to create
23

Id.
Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5.
25 Id. In 1970, Congress reauthorized the Act for another five years and extended the
Coverage Formula in § 4(b) to jurisdictions that had a voting test and less than 50 percent voter
registration or turnout as of 1968. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970) (originally enacted as Voting
Rights Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314) (current version as amended at 52 U.S.C.
§ 10301 (2016)). In 1975, Congress reauthorized the Act for seven more years and extended
the same coverage formula to voting conditions as of 1972. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970)
(originally enacted as Voting Rights Act of 1965, amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat.
402) (current version as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2016)). Congress also extended the
Voting Rights Act to forbid discrimination based on membership in a language minority
group. See id. In 1982, Congress reauthorized the Act for 25 years. See Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1982 § 2.
26 Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1307 (2016) (quoting 52
U.S.C. § 10304(b)).
27 Id. In Shelby County v. Holder, the U.S. Supreme Court held the coverage formula of
§ 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional rendering § 5 unenforceable. 570 U.S. 529,
557 (2013). See a more comprehensive discussion of Shelby County infra Part III.
24
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majority-minority districts in which a majority of the voters and
residents of the district are racial minorities (African-American) or
language minorities (Hispanic).28 These majority-minority districts
were created for the specific purpose of increasing minority legislative
representation.
In the 1970s, polarized anti-minority voting by whites,
combined with lower registration and turnout among minorities,
resulted in the perceived need to create not only majority-minority
districts, but even super majority-minority districts drawn to contain at
least 65% minority population.29 Packing African-American voters
into concentrated electoral vote ghettos, ostensibly to assure election
of African-Americans, may have had the unintended consequence of
helping to elect a candidate for President who surely was not the choice
of African-Americans.
II.

NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF MAJORITY-MINORITY VRA
DISTRICTS

Majority-minority districts, however laudatory, resulted in two
collateral negatives. First, they resulted, ipso facto, in lower voter
turnout in those districts. Second, because the minority vote in those
districts was overwhelmingly Democratic, the Democratic vote was
concomitantly lower.
In this respect, recent Census Bureau data confirm that the
African-American “voter turnout took a decided downturn in last
November’s [2016] election—helping to compound the impact of the
lower than 2012 vote margins that Democrat Hillary Clinton received
in her loss to Donald Trump.”30

28

The Future of Majority-Minority Districts in Light of Declining Racially Polarized
Voting, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2208, 2208 (2003). In Bush v. Vera, the Court observed that the
Texas legislature drew several majority-minority districts “with a view to complying with the
Voting Rights Act.” 517 U.S. 952, 957 (1996).
29 Future of Majority-Minority Districts, supra note 28, at 2216. The 65% number was
chosen by allocating 5% over 50% for lesser voting population (predominantly underage
individuals), 5% for lower voter registration, plus 5% because of lower turnout. See Future
of Majority-Minority Districts, supra note 28, at 2216 n.48 (citing DEWEY M. CLAYTON,
AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 75 (2000)).
30 William H. Frey, Census Shows Pervasive Decline in 2016 Minority Voter Turnout,
BROOKINGS: THE AVENUE (May 18, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/theavenue/
2017/05/18/census-shows-pervasive-decline-in-2016-minority-voter-turnout/ (emphasis in
original).
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With Barack Obama on the ballot in 2012, the AfricanAmerican voter turnout rate (66%) surpassed that of whites for the first
time. As a May 18, 2017 Brookings Institute Report noted, the strong
African-American voter turnout for Obama was probably “attributable
to an extraordinary surge in enthusiasm for the first African-American
major party nominee . . . .”31 With Hillary Clinton on the ballot in
2016, the number of African-American voters declined by
approximately 765,000, falling seven percentage points to 59.6%.32
While this finding was politically irrelevant in blue states where
Clinton won the popular vote overwhelmingly, and correspondingly
the electoral vote, it made a significant difference in three swing
states—Michigan Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania.
It is an axiom of the voting world that the more competitive the
electoral environment, the greater voter turnout. A competitive
election results in greater campaign resources, such as money, get-outthe-vote efforts, local campaign funded offices, greater media attention
and intense advertising efforts. The linkage between electoral
competitiveness and voter turnout is thus clear.33
Michigan
Michigan’s 13th (formerly 14th) Congressional District is a
paradigmatic example of a majority-minority district where the
absence of any competitive congressional race in 2016 appears to have
contributed to a lower voter turnout than in 2012. Michigan’s 13th
Congressional District for more than 53 years has been represented by
Representative John Conyers, an African-American Democratic
congressman.34 Congressman Conyers’ margin of victory against

31

Id.
Jens Manuel Krogstat & Mark Hugo Lopez, Black Voter Turnout Fell in 2016, Even as
Record Number of Americans Cast Ballots, PEW RES. CTR. (May 12, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/05/12/black-voter-turnout-fell-in-2016-even-asa-record-number-of-americans-cast-ballots/.
33 Alexander Agadjanian, A Correlation Between State Competitiveness and Voter
Turnout?, DECISION DESK HQ (Dec. 19, 2016, 6:06 PM), https://decisiondeskhq.com/datadives/a-correlation-between-state-competitiveness-and-voter-turnout-guest-post-byalexander-agadjanian/. See generally MARK N. FRANKLIN, VOTER TURNOUT AND THE
DYNAMICS OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION IN ESTABLISHED DEMOCRACIES SINCE 1945 (2004).
34 John Conyers Jr., BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/John_Conyers_Jr. (last visited
June 3, 2018). On December 5, 2017, Congressman Conyers resigned from the House of
Representatives as a result of a sexual scandal. Id.
32
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Republican challengers has been overwhelming, with Conyers
receiving 77.1% to 92.9% of the vote.35
In 2016, a total of only 265,343 people voted for President in
Michigan’s 13th Congressional District.36 That was 27,821 fewer
voters than the 293,164 people who voted for President there in 2012.37
President Trump’s margin of victory in Michigan was only
approximately 10,000 votes.38 Had the voter turnout in Michigan’s
13th Congressional District in 2016 been equal to the voter turnout in
2012, Clinton would have received approximately 21,925 additional
votes (78.81% of 27,821) compared to only approximately 5,044
additional votes for Trump (18.13% of 27,821).39 Consequently, the
margin of victory might have swung in Clinton’s favor with her
winning the popular vote by 4,517 votes and, with that, Michigan’s 16
electoral votes.
Pellucidly, since there was no competitive
congressional race in the 13th Congressional District, the low turnout
in that majority-minority district was a contributing factor in Clinton
losing Michigan’s 16 electoral votes.
Wisconsin
While Wisconsin’s 4th Congressional District is not a majorityminority district, it is 33.6% African-American40 and is represented by
a long-term African-American incumbent, Gwen Moore, who has won
with a large percentage of the vote.41 While not a classic majorityminority district, its voting patterns closely mirror those of traditional
Voting Rights Act districts.

35

Id.
See Daily Kos Elections’ Statewide Election Results by Congressional and Legislative
Districts, DAILY KOS (July 9, 2013, 2:52 PM), https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2013/07/09/
1220127/-Daily-Kos-Elections-2012-election-results-by-congressional-and-legislativedistricts.
37 See id.
38 Id. See also Michigan Presidential Race Results: Donald J. Trump Wins, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 1, 2017, 11:25 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/results/michigan-presidentclinton-trump.
39 See Daily Kos Elections’, supra note 36.
40 See My Congressional District, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/mycd/
(last visited June 3, 2018).
41 Congresswoman Moore was elected by her colleagues to serve in the leadership of the
Congressional Black Caucus as Caucus Whip. Biography, CONGRESSWOMAN GWEN MOORE,
https://gwenmoore.house.gov/biography/ (last visited June 3, 2018).
36
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In 2016, a total of only 308,575 people voted for President in
Wisconsin’s 4th Congressional District, 47,780 fewer than the 356,355
people who voted for President there in 2012.42 Trump’s margin of
victory in Wisconsin was approximately 23,000.43 Had the voter
turnout in Wisconsin’s 4th Congressional District in 2016 been equal
to the voter turnout in 2012, Clinton would have received
approximately 35,338 additional votes (73.96% of 47,780) compared
to only approximately 10,421 additional votes for Trump (21.81% of
47,780).44 Consequently, the margin of victory might have swung in
Clinton’s favor with her winning the popular vote by 2,169 votes and,
with that, Wisconsin’s 10 electoral votes. As in Michigan, the
diminished turnout in Wisconsin’s 4th Congressional District resulted
at least in part, from the lack of a competitive congressional race.
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania was a third swing state carried by Trump by a
margin of less than 1% of the vote (approximately 45,000).45 Very
likely his margin of victory in Pennsylvania would have been more
robust but for an aberrant political occurrence in one of its Democratic
stronghold majority-minority districts.
The 2nd Congressional District located in Philadelphia was a
majority-minority district whose African-American Democratic
congressmen traditionally won the general election by more than 90%
of the vote. The turnout in the 2nd Congressional District in the 2016
election was almost as great as in the 2012 election.46 While this might
seem counterintuitive, there was an anomalous political occurrence in
this particular district.
From 1994 until 2016, Chaka Fattah was the long term
Democratic African-American Congressman from the 2nd
Pennsylvania Congressional District winning the general elections
almost always with nearly 90% of the vote.47 On June 23, 2016, Fattah
resigned from the House of Representatives following a racketeering
42

See Daily Kos Elections’, supra note 36.
See Daily Kos Elections’, supra note 36.
44
See Daily Kos Elections’, supra note 36.
45 See Daily Kos Elections’, supra note 36.
46 See Daily Kos Elections’, supra note 36.
47 See Pennsylvania’s 2nd Congressional District Elections, 2012, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Pennsylvania%27s_2nd_Congressional_District (last visited June 3,
2018).
43
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conviction.48 Notwithstanding his conviction, Fattah ran for reelection but was defeated in a hotly contested Democratic primary by
Dwight Evans who then won the general election by 90.3% of the
vote.49 A special election to fill out the remainder of Fattah’s term,
which was also won by Evans, was also held on the same day as the
general election.50
Plainly, all of the election activity (3 elections) revolving about
the Fattah-Evans contests was a significant factor in contributing to the
greater general election turnout in 2016. Because of this unusual
election activity happening in Pennsylvania’s 2nd Congressional
District, we cannot draw conclusions either way as to its impact on the
turnout in 2016. Also, Trump’s margin of victory of 45,000 votes may
have been too large to overcome even with an increased voter turnout
in the 2nd Congressional District.
Admittedly, while the lower 2016 voter turnout in the
Wisconsin and Michigan majority-minority districts was probably not
entirely attributable to lack of congressional competitiveness in the
African-American congressional districts, lack of competition in those
African-American congressional races was at least a significant
contributing factor in the lower voter turnout.
Concededly, had Clinton won only the Wisconsin and
Michigan electoral votes and not Pennsylvania, she would have
diminished Trump’s total by only 26 (16+10). Nevertheless, adding
26 electoral votes to Clinton’s electoral vote total of 232 and
subtracting 26 electoral votes from Trump’s 306 electoral vote total
would have left Trump with an electoral vote margin of only 22
electoral votes,51 giving Trump an Electoral College margin even
lower than that of Rutherford B. Hayes.52
While even with a 22 vote electoral margin, Trump still would
have won, a narrower electoral margin would have given even more
48 MaryClaire Dale, US Rep. Fattah Steps Down After Racketeering Conviction, WASH.
TIMES (June 23, 2016), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/23/us-rep-fattahsteps-down-after-racketeering-convic/.
49 See Pennsylvania’s 2nd Congressional District Elections, supra note 47.
50 See Pennsylvania’s 2nd Congressional District Elections, supra note 47.
51 Kierston Schmidt & Wilson Andrews, A Historic Number of Electors Defected, and Most
Were Supposed to Vote for Clinton, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2016/12/19/us/elections/electoral-college-results.html.
52 Initially, Hayes actually lost the electoral vote to Tilden 184 to 165. LLOYD ROBINSON,
THE STOLEN ELECTION: HAYES VERSUS TILDEN-1876, 123-89 (2001). Twenty ballots were
disputed but ultimately were awarded to Hayes as a result of a political compromise. Id. This
gave Hayes the requisite electoral vote majority of 1 vote. Id.
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impetus to those attempts to politically delegitimize the Trump
presidency especially in light of Clinton’s overwhelming popular vote
margin of victory.53
Yet another factor in suppressing voter turnout is the
incumbency advantage.54 Incumbency protection is pervasive,
especially in majority-minority districts. Once the district is racially
gerrymandered and a minority congressperson installed, it is almost
impossible to defeat them other than in a primary (and that only rarely).
The majority-minority district holders are uniformly Democrats
unchallenged in a competitive election, let alone in a primary. For
example, Charles Rangel, an African-American congressman from
Harlem, served in Congress for 46 years.55 He was the second longest
serving incumbent member of the House of Representatives becoming
the first African-American Chairman of the House Ways & Means
Committee, as well as Dean of New York’s Congressional
Delegation.56 From 1972 onward, Rangel won re-election with over
88% of the vote, and often with over 95%, and sometimes no
Republican even ran against him.57
Congressman Jose Serrano is a Hispanic congressman from the
South Bronx who has served as a congressman for over 27 years.58 In
the last 15 years, he has not won an election with less than 63.9% of
the vote.59

53 In fact, had the unusual and aberrational election activity in Pennsylvania’s 2nd
Congressional District in 2016 not skewed the normally low voter turnout upward, it is
theoretically possible (though admittedly speculative) that Trump might have lost
Pennsylvania’s 20 electoral votes (and the presidency itself).
54 See
Congressional
Elections,
LUMEN:
BOUNDLESS
POL.
SCI.,
https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-politicalscience/chapter/congressionalelections/ (last visited June 3, 2018).
55 Charles Rangel, HIST., ART & ARCHIVES: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://history.house.gov/People/Listing/R/RANGEL,-Charles-B--(R000053) (last visited June
3, 2018). Congressman Rangel did not run for re-election in 2016 and was replaced by a
Hispanic individual, Adriano Espaillat, who won the general election overwhelmingly. See
Charles Rangel, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Charles_Rangel (last visited June 3,
2018).
56
Charles Rangel, HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, supra note 55.
57 MICHAEL BARONE & RICHARD E. COHEN, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1169
(2008).
58 See Jose Serrano, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Jose_Serrano (last visited June
3, 2018).
59 See id.
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James Clyburn, an African-American, has represented South
Carolina’s 6th Congressional District for over 25 years.60 In 25 years,
he has won with between 62.9% and 93.6% of the vote.61
As in other super packed majority-minority districts, John
Conyers, discussed above,62 has won with between 77% and 90% of
the vote with ever increasing margins, sometimes with no opponent
whatsoever.63
Incumbency driven lower minority turnout inevitably means a
lesser overall Democratic vote.
III.

RECENT U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS MAY DIMINISH
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICTS IN
FUTURE ELECTIONS
A. Evolution of Case Law in the Supreme Court

In United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v.
Carey,64 in order to obtain preclearance from the Justice Department
pursuant to § 5 of the VRA for Assembly and Senate districts in Kings
County (a covered county), the legislature was required to enact a
redistricting plan that deliberately split an all-white Hasidic Jewish
community previously located within a single Senate and Assembly
district into two separate Senate and Assembly districts.65 This was
considered necessary to create a super majority-minority district of
65% minority population.66 The Hasidic community sued alleging that
the splitting of this community “‘would dilute the value of each
plaintiff’s franchise by halving its effectiveness,’ solely for the purpose
of achieving a racial quota . . . in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”67
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this super
majority-minority district notwithstanding the flat out concession that
“[t]here is no doubt that in preparing the 1974 legislation the State
60 See James Clyburn, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/James_Clyburn (last visited
June 3, 2018).
61 See id.
62
See discussion of John Conyers supra Part II, Michigan.
63 See John Conyers Jr., supra note 34.
64 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
65 Id. at 152.
66 Id. at 164-65.
67 Id. at 152-53.
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deliberately used race in a purposeful manner.”68 Presaging the
Supreme Court’s later discomfort with race-based majority-minority
districting, Chief Justice Warren Burger dissented as follows:
The use of a mathematical formula tends to sustain the
existence of ghettos by promoting the notion that
political clout is to be gained or maintained by
marshaling particular racial, ethnic, or religious groups
in enclaves. It suggests to the voter that only a candidate
of the same race, religion, or ethnic origin can properly
represent that voter’s interests, and that such candidate
can be elected only from a district with a sufficient
minority concentration. The device employed by the
State of New York, and endorsed by the Court today,
moves us one step farther away from a truly
homogeneous society.69
In 1986, in Thornburg v. Gingles,70 the Supreme Court drilled
down on the ingredients of a § 2 vote dilution claim.71 The Court held
that plaintiffs asserting a vote dilution claim under the amended § 2
must at least prove that (1) the state could have drawn an additional,
compact majority-minority district (the Gingles district) but failed to
do so; (2) the minority group is politically “cohesive”—that is, its
members vote in a similar fashion; and (3) the white electorate votes
as a bloc, thus enabling whites usually to defeat the minority group’s
preferred candidates at the polls.72 Professor Samuel Issacharoff
68

Id. at 165.
United Jewish Organizations, 430 U.S. at 186-87 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1030 (1994).
70 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
71 See generally id.
72 Id. at 50-51 (emphasis added). If all three Gingles requirements are established, the
statute requires a further analysis of the “totality of circumstances” to determine whether
members of a racial group have less opportunity than do other members of the electorate. Id.
at 43. The totality of the circumstances analysis was derived from the Supreme Court’s
analytical framework in White and first articulated by the Court in Zimmer v. McKeithen. 485
F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. E. Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424
U.S. 636 (1976) (per curiam) (emphasis added). Those factors were adopted by the Senate
Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at
28-29 (1982). The Supreme Court has invoked the Senate Report on the 1982 amendments to
the Voting Rights Act, which identifies factors typically relevant to a § 2 claim, including:
the history of voting-related discrimination in the State or political
subdivision; the extent to which voting in the elections of the State or
political subdivision is racially polarized; the extent to which the State or
political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to
69
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noted that “Gingles brought the racially polarized voting inquiry into
the undisputed and unchallenged center of the [VRA] . . . .”73 As will
be demonstrated, the corollary is when there is no polarized white
voting, majority-minority districts are unnecessary and often
unconstitutional as racial gerrymanders failing strict scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
By the early 1990s, the Supreme Court changed direction on
the issue of race-based districting. Shaw v. Reno74 involved a
challenge to the constitutionality of a bizarrely shaped, newly created,
African-American congressional district in North Carolina (District
12).75 North Carolina was a state covered by the requirements of § 5
of the VRA.76 The district contained a majority-minority population
drawn to meet the objections of the United States Attorney General to
an earlier version of District 12; the revised District 12 that was at issue
was precleared by the Attorney General.77 A lawsuit claiming that
District 12 was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander reached the
Supreme Court.78 In recognizing a constitutional claim forbidding
racial gerrymandering, the Court, in a 5-4 decision echoing Justice
Burger’s dissent in United Jewish Organizations, stated:

enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group . . .
the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of past
discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which
hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; the
use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; and the extent
to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office
in the jurisdiction. The Report notes also that evidence demonstrating that
elected officials are unresponsive to the particularized needs of the
members of the minority group and that the policy underlying the State’s
or the political subdivision’s use of the contested practice or structure is
tenuous may have probative value.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-45 (citing S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29, 36-37) (internal citations
omitted). See also League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 426
(2006) [hereinafter “LULAC”]. Gingles was a multi-member district case. See generally
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 30. In Growe v. Emison, the Supreme Court applied the Gingles analysis
and holding to single member districts as well. 507 U.S. 25 (1993). See also De Grandy, 512
U.S. at 1015.
73 Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of
Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1851 (1992).
74 509 U.S. 630 (1993) [hereinafter “Reno”].
75 Id. at 655-56.
76 Id. at 634.
77 Id.
78 See generally id. at 630.
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A reapportionment plan that includes in one district
individuals who belong to the same race, but who are
otherwise widely separated by geographical and
political boundaries, and who may have little in
common with one another but the color of their skin,
bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political
apartheid. It reinforces the perception that members of
the same racial group—regardless of their age,
education, economic status, or the community in which
the live—think alike, share the same political interests,
and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We
have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as
impermissible racial stereotypes. By perpetuating such
notions, a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very
patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority
districting is sometimes said to counteract.
The message that such districting sends to elected
representatives is equally pernicious. When a district
obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived
common interests of one racial group, elected officials
are more likely to believe that their primary obligation
is to represent only the members of that group, rather
than their constituency as a whole. This is altogether
antithetical to our system of representative
democracy.79
*

*

*

For these reasons, we conclude that a plaintiff
challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal
Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the
legislation, though race neutral on its face, rationally
cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to
separate voters into different districts on the basis of

79

Reno, 509 U.S. at 647-48 (internal citations omitted).
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race, and that the separation lacks sufficient
justification.80
While recognizing for the first time a constitutional claim of
racial gerrymandering, the Court remanded the case to the District
Court without deciding whether the challenged district in that case, on
its face, constituted an impermissible racial gerrymander.81 Although
it did not decide the merits of the claimed racial gerrymander, in
remanding the case, the Supreme Court instructed that:
If the allegation of racial gerrymandering remains
uncontradicted, the District Court further must
determine whether the North Carolina plan is narrowly
tailored to further a compelling governmental
interest.82
In Miller v. Johnson,83 the Supreme Court, in another 5-4
decision (authored by Justice Kennedy), found a Georgia
congressional redistricting plan unconstitutional as violative of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.84 The plan
contained three majority African-American districts adopted after the
Justice Department refused to preclear an earlier plan that contained
only two African-American majority districts.85 In clarifying racial
gerrymandering claims post Reno, the Court stated:
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides that no State shall “deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” Its central mandate is racial neutrality in
governmental decisionmaking. Though application of
this imperative raises difficult questions, the basic
principle is straightforward: “Racial and ethnic
distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus
call for the most exacting judicial examination. . . . This
perception of racial and ethnic distinctions is rooted in
our Nation’s constitutional and demographic history.”
This rule obtains with equal force regardless of “the
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id. at 649.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 658 (emphasis added).
515 U.S. 900 (1995).
Id. at 924.
Id. at 907-09.
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race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification.” Laws classifying citizens on the basis of
race cannot be upheld unless they are narrowly tailored
to achieving a compelling state interest.86
When the State assigns voters on the basis of race, it
engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption
that voters of a particular race, because of their race,
“think alike, share the same political interests, and will
prefer the same candidates at the polls.”87
First, although acknowledging that the legislature must always
be aware of race when redistricting, the Court found evidence of intent
to racially gerrymander overwhelming and all but stipulated to by the
parties.88 As such, under the Reno precedent, the district was subject
to strict scrutiny.89
In finding the plan unconstitutional, the Court observed that
there was little doubt that the state’s true interest in designing the plan
was to add an extra, third African-American majority district.90 The
Court further found:
The Justice Department refused to preclear both of
Georgia’s first two submitted redistricting plans. The
District Court found that the Justice Department had
adopted a “black-maximization” policy under § 5, and
that it was clear from its objection letters that the
Department would not grant preclearance until the State
made the “Macon/Savannah trade” and created a third
majority-black district. It is, therefore, safe to say that
the congressional plan enacted in the end was required
in order to obtain preclearance. It does not follow,
however, that the plan was required by the substantive
provisions of the Voting Rights Act.

86

Id. at 904 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 911-12 (citing Reno, 509 U.S. at 647).
88 Miller, 515 U.S. at 910.
89 Id. at 913. Rejecting the decision in United Jewish Organizations, the Court in Miller
held “[t]o the extent any of the opinions in that ‘highly fractured decision,’ can be interpreted
as suggesting that a State’s assignment of voters on the basis of race would be subject to
anything but our strictest scrutiny, those views ought not be deemed controlling.” Id. at 915
(internal citations omitted).
90 Id. at 921.
87
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We do not accept the contention that the State has a
compelling interest in complying with whatever
preclearance mandates the Justice Department issues.91
*

*

*

Instead of grounding its objections on evidence of a
discriminatory purpose, it would appear the
Government was driven by its policy of maximizing
majority-black districts.92
In 1996, in Shaw v. Hunt,93 the North Carolina congressional
redistricting plan (District 12) returned to the Supreme Court after the
remand to the District Court.94 The District Court held that the plan
was racially motivated but survived strict scrutiny. 95 The Supreme
Court reversed holding the districting plan unconstitutional.96 North
Carolina had deliberately drawn a bizarrely shaped majority-minority
district in the center of the state (District 12).97 In defending against
the plaintiff’s racial gerrymander claim, the state argued that it had
drawn District 12 to achieve a compelling state interest in compliance
with § 2 [of the VRA].98 The Court assumed, arguendo, that
compliance with § 2 constitutes a compelling state interest justifying
the creation of a majority-minority district. 99
The Court held that a remedy for vote dilution is not narrowly
tailored to comply with § 2 if the remedial district drawn by the state
substantially departs from a compact Gingles district.100 The Court
stated, a bizarrely shaped district “somewhere else in the State” does
not remedy “the vote-dilution injuries suffered by” minority voters
residing within the Gingles district.101 The Court held that creating an

91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Id. at 921-22.
Miller, 515 U.S. at 924.
517 U.S. 899 (1996) [hereinafter “Hunt”].
See generally id.
Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 496 (E.D.N.C. 1994), rev’d, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
See generally Hunt, 517 U.S. at 899.
Id. at 903.
Id. at 911.
Id. at 915.
Id. at 916-17.
Hunt, 517 U.S. at 917.
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additional majority African-American district in North Carolina was
not required under a correct reading of § 5 or § 2 and that District 12,
as drawn, was not a remedy narrowly tailored to the State’s professed
interest in avoiding Voting Rights Act liability.102
Having previously determined in Reno, Miller and Hunt that
the VRA does not justify use of predominate racial gerrymandering as
an excuse to maximize majority-minority districts, the Supreme Court
in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama103 questioned the
very need to create majority-minority districts altogether.104 Thus,
while maximization was prohibited (Miller), even minimal numbers of
majority-minority districts became constitutionally suspect.105
In 2012, the State of Alabama redrew its House and Senate
districts.106 In reversing the District Court,107 the Supreme Court found
that the District Court made four erroneous critical determinations in
finding the challenged, racially driven, districts constitutional.108 First,
contrary to the District Court, a claim for racial gerrymandering is a
claim addressed to specific electoral districts, not statewide districting
as a whole.109 Second, only certain plaintiffs have standing to bring
the claim.110 Third, the District Court erred when it did not find that
race was shown to be the predominant basis for the districting.111
Fourth, the districts were not narrowly tailored when the state sought
to justify unconstitutional predominantly race-based districting as
necessary to comply with § 5 of the VRA.112
Seeking to avoid retrogression in violation of § 5 of the VRA
(as amended in 2006), the state maintained roughly the same AfricanAmerican population percentage within the new districts as existed in
102 Id. at 911. In 2006, in LULAC, Chief Justice Roberts, in an opinion joined by Justice
Alito, claimed that majority-minority districting is all a “sordid business, this divvying us up
by race.” LULAC, 548 U.S. at 511 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
However, the principal holding in LULAC was a finding that Texas District 23 was a violation
of § 2 of the VRA and that Texas District 25 did not violate § 2 of the VRA. Id. at 447.
103 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015).
104 See generally id.
105 See generally id.
106 Id. at 1263.
107 Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (2013), rev’d, 135 S.
Ct. 1257 (2015).
108 Alabama Legislative, 135 S. Ct. at 1264.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
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the earlier 2001 Alabama districting plan.113 The Supreme Court held
that this compliance with § 5 did not survive strict scrutiny because it
was not narrowly tailored to comply with § 5.114 It stated:
Section 5, which covered particular States and certain
other jurisdictions, does not require a covered
jurisdiction to maintain a particular numerical minority
percentage. It requires the jurisdiction to maintain a
minority’s ability to elect a preferred candidate of
choice.115
Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections116 was a 2017
challenge to the State of Virginia’s redrawn state legislative districts.117
In order to comply with the non-retrogression requirements of § 5 of
the VRA, the lines at issue in 12 of the districts were drawn with a goal
of ensuring that each district would have an African-American voting
age population (BVAP) of at least 55%, and in some cases, more.118
The Court reviewed its holdings in Reno, Hunt, Miller
(impermissible racial predominance) and Alabama Legislative (narrow
tailoring analysis) with respect to 11 of the 12 districts.119 It reversed
the District Court and remanded.120 The Supreme Court held “a
conflict or inconsistency between the enacted plan and traditional
redistricting criteria is not a threshold requirement or a mandatory
precondition in order for a challenger to establish a claim of racial
gerrymandering,”121 as the District Court erroneously had found. With
respect to the remaining district (75), the Supreme Court upheld the
District Court’s finding that although District 75 was racially based, it
was on the specific and unique facts of the case, narrowly tailored to
avoid violating § 5 of the VRA.122
In May of 2017, the Supreme Court came out the other way.123
In that year, North Carolina’s congressional districting returned once

113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

Alabama Legislative, 135 S. Ct. at 1286.
Id. at 1272.
Id.
137 S. Ct. 788 (2017).
See generally id.
Id. at 794.
See generally id.
Id. at 802.
Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 799.
Id. at 802.
Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
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again to the Supreme Court.124 After the 2010 census, North Carolina
created two majority-minority districts (District 1 and District 12).125
The legislature increased the BVAP in District 1 from 48.6% to 52.7%
and in District 12 from 43.8% to 50.7%.126 The District Court found
that because race predominated in the enactment of both districts, the
districts became subject to strict scrutiny, which neither district
survived.127
With respect to District 1, the state argued that it was narrowly
tailored to avoid a § 2 vote dilution claim.128 The Supreme Court
affirmed the District Court’s holding that compliance with § 2 of the
VRA was legally impossible in that case because the third Gingles
prerequisite to a § 2 claim (polarized white racial voting) could not be
demonstrated.129 Therefore, compliance with § 2 was unavailing to
justify the racial motivation informing the construction of the
district.130 Since there was no possibility of a § 2 violation, there was
no justification for a predominantly race based district as necessary to
avoid § 2 liability.131
With respect to District 12, the Supreme Court found evidence
that racial considerations also predominated in designing District 12.132
Since North Carolina did not even attempt to justify District 12’s racial
classification, the district was clearly constitutionally infirm.133
Although the Supreme Court never determined the precise
minority percentage a majority-minority district could contain that
would pass muster against a § 2 racial gerrymander dilution claim,
leaving it to a case by case factual analysis, it clearly continued to
demonstrate its concern with the constitutional problems inherent in
the creation of majority-minority districts.134 It also continued its view

124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

See generally id.
Id. at 1466.
Id.
Id.
Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1469.
Id. at 1470.
Id. at 1471.
Id.
Id. at 1478.
Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1478.
See generally id; see also Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018).
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that the VRA usually cannot be used as an excuse to construct
unconstitutional race based majority-minority districts.135
More importantly, the Supreme Court has recognized the fact
that there has been a visible slackening of white voter polarization in
the United States in recent years and African-Americans can elect
candidates of their choice (presumably other African-Americans, if
they so choose) without the necessity of packing a district with an
excess of African-American voters. This ever changing new voting
phenomenon is graphically demonstrated in the relatively recent
Supreme Court decision in Shelby County v. Holder.136
In holding § 4 of the VRA (the Coverage Formula)
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court’s rationale rested on the belief
that increased African-American voting strength made remedial
statutes like § 4 of the VRA unnecessary and, therefore,
unconstitutional.137
Writing for a 5-4 majority, Chief Justice Roberts wrote:
“[v]oter turnout and registration rates now approach
parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal
decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at
unprecedented levels.” The tests and devices that
blocked access to the ballot have been forbidden
nationwide for over 40 years. . . .
Those conclusions are not ours alone. Congress said
the same when it reauthorized the Act in 2006, writing
that “[s]ignificant progress has been made in
eliminating first generation barriers experienced by
minority voters, including increased numbers of
registered minority voters, minority voter turnout, and
minority representation in Congress, State legislatures,
and local elected offices.” The House Report elaborated
that “the number of African-Americans who are
registered and who turn out to cast ballots has increased
135

See generally id. See also Tarini Parti, High Court Reasserts Voting Rights Act in
Alabama Decision, POLITICO (Mar. 25, 2015, 12:04 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/
03/supreme-court-alabama-redistricting-ruling-116384.
136 See introduction of this 2013 case supra note 27. The Shelby County case declared the
Coverage Formula of § 4(b) of the VRA unconstitutional in light of current conditions and
based on unequal sovereignty treatment of various states in violation of federalism principles.
Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 553. Without § 4(b), § 5 became unenforceable. Id. at 557.
137 Id.
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significantly over the last 40 years, particularly since
1982,” and noted that “[i]n some circumstances,
minorities register to vote and cast ballots at levels that
surpass those of white voters.” That Report also
explained that there have been “significant increases in
the number of African-Americans serving in elected
offices”; more specifically, there has been
approximately a 1,000 percent increase since 1965 in
the number of African-American elected officials in the
six States originally covered by the Voting Rights
Act.138
Notwithstanding the distaste some Justices have for majorityminority districts, the Supreme Court has not yet declared § 2 of the
VRA unconstitutional.139
However, the declaration in Shelby County that § 4(b) of the
VRA was unconstitutional rested in part on the fact that white
polarized voting had diminished and there was “increased numbers of
registered minority voters, minority voter turnout, and minority
representation in Congress.”140 That same logic could easily be applied
to § 2. In essence, the claim would be that there is no longer a need
for § 2, or even the VRA altogether, to remedy African-American vote
dilution since the African-American vote is not being diluted anymore,
white polarization has eroded, and race-based districting is inherently
unconstitutional.
B. Partisanship and Minority-Majority Districting
Not only does creating safe minority-majority Democratic
congressional seats negatively impact voter turnout, which in turn,
could cause a Democratic Party presidential candidate to lose a state’s
electoral vote, but over concentrating African-Americans into urban
138

Id. at 547 (internal citations omitted).
See, e.g., Bush, 517 U.S. at 992 (“We should allow States to assume the constitutionality
of § 2 of the VRA, including the 1982 amendments.”); De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1028-29 (1994)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“It is important to emphasize that the
precedents to which I refer, like today’s decision, only construe the statute, and do not purport
to assess its constitutional implications.”); Shelby County, 570 U.S at 556-57 (“That is why,
in 2009, we took care to avoid ruling on the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act when
asked to do so . . . .”). See generally LUIS FUENTES-ROHWER, THE FUTURE OF SECTION 2 OF
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN THE HANDS OF A CONSERVATIVE COURT (2010).
140 Shelby County, 570 U.S at 547.
139
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districts (which is usually where they reside) actually hurts the
Democratic Party’s ability to win congressional seats.141
It is an article of political faith that African-Americans vote
overwhelmingly Democratic,142 which the Supreme Court has
recognized in a number of cases.
In 1998, North Carolina enacted yet another congressional
redistricting plan (again involving District 12).143 The plan was
challenged as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.144 The District
Court granted summary judgment finding the 12th District
unconstitutional on the ground that it was primarily race based.145 The
Supreme Court reversed finding summary judgment premature and
remanding to the District Court for a fact based inquiry as to whether
the District was drawn for political purposes, namely “to make District
12 a strong democratic District,” or was an unconstitutional race based
District.146 In doing so, the Supreme Court stated:
Our prior decisions have made clear that a jurisdiction
may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering,
even if it so happens that the most loyal Democrats
happen to be black Democrats and even if the State
were conscious of that fact.147
Upon remand, the District Court, after trial, found that race, not
politics, predominated in the construction of District 12.148 The
Supreme Court again reversed holding that the evidence showed that
the motivation of the legislature in enacting the boundaries of District
12 was to create an overwhelmingly Democratic District (since
African-American voters vote overwhelmingly for Democratic
candidates and the district’s boundaries were primarily politically, not
racially, driven).149

141 See Steven Hill, How the Voting Rights Act Hurts the Democrats and Minorities, THE
ATLANTIC: POL. (June 17, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/06/howthe-voting-rights-act-hurts-democrats-and-minorities/276893/.
142 Matthew Delmont, When Black Voters Exited Left, THE ATLANTIC: POL. (Mar. 31, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/exit-left/476190/.
143 See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
144
See generally id.
145 Id. at 543.
146 Id. at 549.
147 Id. at 551 (emphasis added and in original).
148 Cromartie, 526 U.S. at 552.
149 Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
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In Bush, in finding the districts in question to be
unconstitutional because their construction was primarily race based,
the Supreme Court nevertheless recognized that the African-American
vote is overwhelmingly Democratic stating: “as it happens, . . . many
of the voters being fought over [by the neighboring Democratic
incumbents] were African-American.”150
Accordingly, when the African-American voter turnout is
diminished, the corresponding Democratic vote is similarly
diminished.
Political pundits overwhelmingly have recognized that
drawing of majority-minority districts not only elected
more minorities, it also had the effect of bleeding
minority voters out of all the surrounding districts.
Given that minority voters were the most reliably
Democratic voters, that made all of the neighboring
districts more Republican. The black, Latino, and Asian
representatives mostly were replacing white
Democrats, and the increase in minority representation
was coming at the expense of electing fewer
Democrats.151
An article published in Sabato’s Crystal Ball echoes the view
stating:
the fact is that many Democrats would prefer to weaken
majority-minority districts. Part of the Democrats’
challenge in winning the House is that the VRA forces
them to place their most loyal supporters into districts
with one another. If Democrats could weaken these
districts, they could dilute Republican strength in the
suburbs and create more Democratic districts.152

150

Bush, 517 U.S. at 968.
Hill, supra note 141.
152 Sean Trende, The 2020 Reapportionment and the Voting Rights Act, U. OF VA. CTR. FOR
POL.: SABATO’S CRYSTAL BALL (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/
articles/the-2020-reapportionment-and-the-voting -rights-act/.
151
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This absence of competitive races against the almost 48
incumbent African-American congresspeople153 assuredly has been a
major cause of the low voter turnout in those districts which, in turn,
contributes to a lower Democratic vote. Further, not only are there 48
African-American congresspeople—almost all in super safe majorityminority districts and almost all Democrats—but there are also 29
Hispanic representatives (all Democrats) protected by the VRA. Like
their fellow African-American congresspeople, these Hispanic
representatives are elected from majority-minority districts with 75%
to 90% of the vote, often with no Republican opponents.154
Accordingly, at minimum, 18% of the entire House of Representatives
face no real competitive races. Certainly voter turnout generally, and
Democratic turnout in particular, has to be negatively affected.
Once majority-minority districts pass into election history, the
congressional districts with substantial minority population (albeit not
necessarily a majority) will become more competitive. This would
increase minority turnout which would then result in a larger
Democratic vote statewide and which, in turn, would cause the
electoral vote in the swing states to go to the Democratic candidate
rather than to the Republican.
Given the history of endemic discrimination against minorities,
especially with respect to the voting franchise, the VRA was a
compelling necessity designed to redress the voting grievances of
disenfranchised minorities. Majority-minority districts proved to be a
laudatory and successful mechanism to effect the election of minorities
to federal, state and local legislative offices. The number of minorities
elected to office grew dramatically over the years commencing in 1965
with the passage of the VRA.
While its beginnings had salutary effects, over the years those
majority-minority districts caused collateral damage to the civil rights
cause. Packing the districts overwhelmingly with minorities caused
the Supreme Court in the 1990s to greet majority-minority districts

153 Black-American Representatives and Senators by Congress, 1870-Present, HIST., ART
& ARCHIVES: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-andPublications/BAIC/Historical-Data/Black-American-Representatives-and-Senators-byCongress/ (last visited June 3, 2018).
154 As noted, in 1975, Congress extended the VRA to forbid discrimination based on
membership in a language minority group (Hispanic, Asians, et al.). See supra note 25.
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with increasing constitutional skepticism. Contemporaneously with
this legal development, voting dynamics changed so that white
polarized voting against minorities’ candidate of choice abated.
Minorities could begin to elect candidates of their choice with enough
white votes so as to make majority-minority districts electorally
unnecessary.155 This led the Supreme Court to declare § 4, and
inevitably § 5 of the VRA unconstitutional, and as noted in this article,
placed § 2 of VRA in some constitutional jeopardy.
Worse still, the existence of packed minorities in majorityminority districts diminished the turnout in those heavily Democratic
districts possibly leading to a narrow electoral victory for Donald
Trump in Wisconsin and Michigan, surely not the candidate of choice
of the minority voters.
The remedy for increased voter turnout in the AfricanAmerican voting districts is to increase election competition. To
accomplish this, it will be necessary to unpack the concentration of
African-American voters presently located in single districts and
spread them among more than one congressional district. Given
current electoral dynamics, this can be done without effectively
jeopardizing the ability of African-Americans to elect candidates of
their own choice consonant with § 2 of the VRA.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore recommended that after the 2020 census, VRA
districts be drawn to walk a fine line between increasing competition
while still giving minorities sufficient real opportunity to elect
candidates of their choice. Given the state of the advanced technology
available to effectuate accurate redistricting, the goal of giving
minorities the ability to elect candidates of their choice without the
necessity of creating overly concentrated majority-minority districts is
eminently attainable.

155

Indeed, in the recent hotly contested U.S. Senate race in deep red Alabama, the AfricanAmerican turnout of 41% exceeded the 35% turnout of white voters. Alan Blinder & Michael
Wines, Black Turnout in Alabama Complicates Debate on Voting Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/24/us/alabama-voting-blacks-.html.
The
Democratic candidate won more than 90% of the African-American vote thus enabling him to
win a rare narrow victory over his Republican opponent in a State which had not elected a
Democratic Senator since 1990.
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